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Some Effects of Ideology and Threat upon the size of 
Opinion Coalitions on the United States Supreme Court~ 
SAUL BRENNER 
THEODORE S. AluuNGTON 
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
Scholars engaged in the behavioral study of the Supreme Court 
usually explain differences in voting on the Court as a function of differ-
ing judicial .attitudes toward public issues. Rather than assuming tihat 
attitudes determine behavior and there is nothing more to say, we will 
explore the possibility that certain coalition-formation processes in-
fluence the relationship between attitudes and behavior on the Court. 
More specifically, we will focus upon the number of justices who support 
the Court's opinions in an attempt to ascertain the extent to which 
opinion size is determined by ideological and non-ideological variables. 
If non-ideological factors affect the size of Supreme Court opinions 
it is valuable to identify them. One such variable was discovered by 
David Rohde 1 who examined the civil liberties opinions of the Warren 
Court and found that issues that posed a threat to the Court produced 
larger winning coalitions than other issues. We will reexamine Rohde's 
finding in this paper. 
OPINION SIZE AND IDEOLOGY 
If one is concerned with the size of winning coalitions, it is reason-
able to turn to the size principle fommlated by William Riker.2 The 
Riker notion is based upon a division of payoff rationale. More precisely, 
it assumes that there is a fixed and constant payoff or benefit of winning 
which will be divided by the members of the winning coalition. There-
fore, those who first form a minimum winning coalition will seek to re-
main minimum winning, for to allow others to join will reduce their 
shares of the winnings. The major defect of using the Riker model for 
" This article is derived from an earlier one titled "The Size Principle and 
Supreme Court Decision Making," presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the 
Southern Political Science Association, November 6-8, 1975, at the Hyatt Regency 
Hotel in Nashville, Tennessee. We wish to thank Jim Gibson of the University of 
Wisconsin at Milwaukee and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on 
the paper. 
1 David W. Rohde,, "Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme Court," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science 17 (May 1972), 208-224. 
2 William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1962). 
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the study of the Supreme Court is that in the Court, as in most politica l 
bodies, "there is no payoff waiting to be divided. Instead, payoffs are 
those proposals ... which are agreed upon by coalition members once 
a coalition has been fo1med." 3 
If the winning coalition on the Court is the opinion majority, it may, 
nevertheless, remain minimum winning; but not because of the reason 
suggested by Riker. Rather , the minimum winning size will be a con-
sequence of the desire of the opinion writer to have the opinion mirror 
his policy views and his refusal, therefore, to write an opinion that might 
attract the votes of additional justices. 4 Based upon this model Rohde 
hypothesized that in the usual situation the opinion coalition will be 
minimum winning. 
If the opinion writer seeks an opinion that most approximates his 
own policy preferences, as Rohde contends, the opinion coalition that 
will be created will consist of the opinion writer himself and the four 
justices closest to ,him ideologically. Yet when Rohde tested his minimum 
winning model he ignored ideology altogether . Inst ead, he posite d that 
an opinion coalition consisting of any five or six justices, without regard 
to ideological position, would indicate minimum winning voting on the 
Court. Rhode's operationalization conforms to the Riker model and not 
to his own. We agree with Rohde's model but not with the way he 
tested it. 
There may be circumstances when the opinion writer will seek 
additional votes for his opinion. In these situations he will be motivate d 
( and the additional justices induced to join the opinion) by goals other 
than, or at least in addition to, ideology. For, if the sole motivation of 
the opinion writer was an opinion that conformed to his ideologi cal 
position, he would refuse to write an opinion to accommodate the views 
of justices beyond the minimum winning size. Thus, we anticipate that 
opinion coalitions of larger than five members will be l,ess ideological ly 
based than five-person coalitions. More specifically, we hypothesize : 
Coalitions larger than minimum winning are less likely to occupy 
the smallest ideological space and are less likely to be ideological ly 
connected than coalitions with five-man majorities . 
To test this hypothesis we will assume, as did Rohde, that the 
winning coalition on the Court is the opinion majority ( those justices 
3 Eric C. Browne. CoaUtion Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique 
( Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 73. 
4 David W. Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the 
United States Suprem e Court," in Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg (eds.) 
Probability Models of Collective Decision <Making ( Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1972). 
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who join the Court's opinion) , instead of the decision majority ( those 
justices who agree with the Court's disposition of the case). Using the 
opinion majority does not result in substantially different coalitions than 
if we employed the decision majority, for in seventy-one percent of ·the 
cases from our data set the membership of both coalitions was the same 
and in additional 14.5 percent of the cases the composition of the two 
coalitions differed in terms of the vote of only one justice. 
In his study of the size of the opinion coalitions 5 Rohde examined 
the civil liberties cases of the Warren Court. Since we are interested in 
the validity of his findings, it would be desirable to use the same cases 
he did. Unfortunately, this cannot be done since Rohde discarded his 
list of cases.6 Instead, we will utilize similar data, namely, the cases used 
by Rohde in his opinion assignment study. 7 These consist of 615 cases, 
which comprise all orally argued civil liberties decisions of the Warren 
Court that could be placed into thirty-four Guttman scales. We refined 
Rohde's list of cases for the purposes of this study by omitting the 110 
per cur-iam decisions . When the Court decides a case per cttriam it 
usually means that the case is insufficiently important for anyone to seek 
an ideologically pure opinion. Rather, these cases are handled sum-
marily with no opinion writer and with the expectation that all the 
justices usually will agree with ,the short opinion. We further refined 
Rohde's list by eliminating the twenty-six cases which either contained 
more than one opinion of the Court with different justices joining the 
multiple opinions or were companion to other cases with the same votes 
and were counted twice by Rohde. Our final data set consisted of 479 
cases. 
The ideological positions of the justices were obtained by employing 
the scale scores in Rohde's thirty-four scales. Utilizing such ,a large 
number of scales enabled us to locate with precision the position of the 
justices in the various ,areas. We used the scores as interval measures of 
the justices' ideal points or most preferred positions on the issues. There 
is precedent for considering Guttman scales as interval measures, 8 and 
5 Rohde, "Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions." 
6 Joseph L. Bernd, R. W. Hoyle and Lawrence S. Mayer. "Some Problems with 
the Theory of Political Coalitions as Applied to the Judiciary," a paper delivered at 
the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Palmer House, 
Chicago. 
7 David W. Rohde, "Policy Goals, Strategic Choices and Majority Opinion As-
sigrunents in the U. S. Supreme Court," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 
( November 1972), pp. 652-82. 
8 Rohde, "Policy Goals, Strategic Choices"; Gregory James Rathjen, "A Theory 
of lntracourt Influence: The Supreme Court," a paper delivered at the 1973 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Jung Hotel, New Orleans. 
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such use is supported by Blalock and others. 9 There is doubt, however 
about the ability of such scales to identify ideal points. iemi and 
Weisberg 10 argue that Guttman scales fail to distinguish such points, 
because the dichotomous nature of the raw data may hide the true ideal 
point of an individual. This problem cannot be surmounted here, since 
our scales are based on roll call data which are always dichotomous. Thus 
we decided to proceed by making the unsupported assumption tha~ 
Rohde's scales are valid approximations of the ideal points of the justices . 
In testing our hypothesis we divided the cases into three groups . The 
first is the smallest space coalitions. This means a coalition in which the 
opinion majority occupies the smallest possible span on that Guttman 
scale for that size coalition. If the opinion majority included justices who 
are adjacent to each other on the ideological scale, but the coalition does 
not occupy the smallest ideological space , we placed it in a second cate-
gory called "ideologically connected." A third category consists of non-
connected cases. The smallest space group is the most ideologically based, 
the non-connected category the least , and the connected cases in an 
intermediate position. The seventy-one unanimous cases were excluded 
from this analysis since they all fall into the smallest ideological space 
category. The seventeen cases in which the opinion coalition was less 
than five justices were also omitted because the small N makes the figures 
unreliable. 
To determine whether coalitions beyond minimum winning are less 
ideologically based than minimum winning ones, it is useful to posit a 
norm of non-ideologically based voting for each size coalition. For this 
purpose we will use the Riker model which assumes that it is equally 
likely for any justice to vote the same way as any other justice . As can be 
seen from Table 1, the Riker model gives results that are precisely the 
opposite to our expectations. If ideology were unrelated to the selection 
of coalition partners then the chance of a case having an ideolog ically 
connected coalition or a smallest space coalition would increase as the 
size of the opinion coalition increases. 
Table 2 shows the relationship between the size of the opinion 
coalition and the nature of that coalition . Contrary to the Riker model, 
the minimum winning coalitions ( five members) have the largest share 
of smallest space coalitions and the smallest number of non-connecte d 
ones. Coalitions beyond minimum winning are, indeed, less ideologica lly 
based, with six-, seven- and eight-member coalitions equally likely to be 
o See sources cited in footnote 23 in Rathjen, Ibid. 
10 Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Single Peakedness and Guttman 
Scales: Concepts and Measurement," Public Choice XX (Winter 1974), 33-45. 
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non-connected. That our data indicate that eight-man coalitions are more 
likely to be smallest space coalitions than six- or seven-man coalitions 
is not strong evidence to the contrary. Rather, this result simply reflects 
the greater likelihood of achieving such coalitions by chance when only 
one justice is dissenting. If the data in Table 2 is collapsed so that the 
six-, seven- and eight-member coalition columns are combined, the 
gamma figure increases to .32, and the z-score also increases indicating 
greater statistical signifioance.11 Thus it is clear that ideology is relevant 
to the formation of the minimum winning coalitions, but less so for larger 
coalitions. This result probably suggests two situations operating on the 
Court. One ciJ:cumstance would be when the opinion writer seeks ideo-
logical purity and as a consequence a minimum winning vote will occur. 
The other involves when the opinion writer seeks a maximum vote and 
when that takes place ideology will be less important. In the second 
situation an opinion will be written that appeals to as many justices as 
possible. Some justices, however, still will refuse to join because of role 
or personality reasons. These refusals are non-ideological and, therefore, 
are unrelated to ideological scale scores. 
TABLE 1 
Relationship Between the Size of the Opinion Mafority 
and the Nature of the C oal,ition 
Non-Ideological Norm BMed on the Riker Model 
Size of the Opinion Coalition 
Five Six Seven Eight 
Smallest space ideologically for 
that size coalition assuming 
only one possible smallest 
space situation ...... . 
Connected but not smallest 
space ...... . .... .. ... . .. . 













Total .... . . . . ........ . .. .. . 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
11 For the methods of computing the significance of gamma see Linton G. 
Freeman, Elementary Ap·plied Statics for Students in Behavioral Science (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1965) , Chapter 13. 
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TABLE 2 
Relationship Between the Size of the Opinion Majority 
and the Nature of the Coalition 
The Actual Data from Rohde Cases 
Size of the Opinion Coalition 
Five Six Seven Eight 
Smallest space ideologically for that 
size coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55% 
Connected, but not smallest space . 21 










Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100% 100% 101 % 100% 
N = . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 164) ( 121) ( 60) ( 46) 
Gamma=.23, z=3.48, statistically significant at the .01 level 
This conclusion suggests ithe further question concerning the condi-
tions under which minimum winning results are sought and those under 
which a maximum vote is pursued. One possible condition when a maxi-
mum vote is likely is when the justices seek to protect the Court from an 
outside threat. It is to this subject that we now tum. 
OPI ION SIZE AND THREAT 
It was David Rohde 12 who first tested the relationship between 
threat and opinion size. Rohde divided the civil liberties issue areas he 
examined into threat and nonthreat areas and found that in nonthreat 
situations there is a "progressive tendency" toward opinion majmities of 
five or six members, while in threat situations opinion majorities tended 
to consist of either nine or eight justices or five or six in about equal pro-
portions.13 Despite the mixed findings Rohde obtained for the threat 
category, he concluded that the threat/nonthreat distinction was crucial. 
Rohde assumed that the mere presence of a threat will induce justices 
originally outside the original minimum coalition to join the Court's 
opinion. But the mixed results found by Rohde for his threat issue areas 
undermine this assumption. Rather, we contend that larger than minimum 
winning votes are likely to occur only in those threat circumstances in 
which the justices originally in the minority are persuaded that joining 
the Court's opinion is to their benefit. In making this decision the minority 
12 Rohde , "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions." 
13 Rohde, "Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions," p. 219. 
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justices are likely to ask themselves such questions as: ( 1) How severe is 
the outside threat? ( 2) How much will our votes add to the Court's 
defense? ( 3) How strong is the pressure being applied by the opinion 
writer and other justices to persuade us rto join the Court's opinion? and 
( 4) How much of our ideological commitments will we have to surrender 
to do so? Based upon the responses to such questions the minority 
justices will calculate in crude cost/ benefit terms whether joining the 
Court's opinion is in rtheir interest or not. At the same time the opinion 
writer will make a similar evaluation to determine how broad an opinion 
he will be willing to write and how much pressure he and his colleagues 
will be willing to exert to gain the additional votes. 
Rohde identified two kinds of threats to the Court-threats to the 
Court's power and threats to its authority: 
Threats to the Court's power will be defined as serious pending 
attempts to limit the Court's jurisdiction in an issue area . . . or 
to change the Court's personnel. ... Threats to the Court's authority 
will be defined to exist in issue areas in which it is probable that there 
may be serious resistance or disobedience to the Court's mandate by 
those to whom it will apply ... 14 
Rohde included under the first category ( i.e., threats to the Court's 
power) the internal security cases decided during the consideration by 
Congress of the Jenner-Butler Bill of 1958 rand listed under his second 
category ( i.e., rthreats to the Court's authority) the establishment of 
religion decisions, the protest cases involving the rights of blacks, cases 
concerning involuntary confessions, warrantless search and seizure de-
cisions, and cases involving racial discrimination. 
From our knowledge of the threat cases it appears likely that the 
circumstances favorable for a maximum winning vote were present only 
in the racial discrimination area. We know from Ulmer's research on the 
Brown decision of 1954 that the justices on the Court were aware that 
Ohief Justice Warren's proposed opinion would evoke resistance to the 
Court. 115 Warren specifically urged unanimity to meet that threat and 
exerted much effort over a number or months to achieve that goal. We 
also know that the justices who originally disagreed with WaJ.Ten's 
position were ideologically close to it. These justices had joined in the 
unanimous vote for the three previous school desegregation decisions 
prior to Brown; i.e., Sipuel v. Board of Regents 332 US 631 ( 1948), 
14 Ibid., p. 212. 
15 S. Sidney Uhner, "Earl Warren and the Brown Decision," Journal of Politics 
33 ( August 1971). 692-696. 
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Sweatt t>. Painter 339 US 629 (1950), and McLaurin t>. Oklahoma State 
Regents 339 US 639 ( 1950). In Brown itself the minority justices argued 
that the Court should refrain from rejecting the separate but equal doc-
trine, not because they favored segregation, but mainly because they 
feared disruption in the schools.16 These justices could hardly dissent 
from an opinion with which they sympathized on the grounds that it 
might inflame disobedience, for then, ,they could be accused of fostering 
the very result they feared. Thus in Brown the situation was ripe for a 
unanimous vote and Warren achieved it. It is probable that Warren's 
influence endured beyond Brown and affected the size of opinion coali-
tions in the other racial discrimination cases as well. 
In the other threat .areas listed by Rohde there is no evidence that the 
conditions were favorable for a maximum vote. In some ,areas a threat 
was present in one or two cases only and thus the area is of little statisti cal 
importance . In the internal security area only a few cases at most can be 
classified as a threat to the Court's power and may even involve only one 
case, Speiser t>. Randall 375 US 513 ( 1968), for in Rohde' s first testing of 
the threat hypothesis 17 this was the only internal security case he in-
cluded. Only one establishment of religion case was likely to be viewed 
by the Court as a threat to its authority. That case is Abingto n v. 
Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963), the Bible reading and Lord's prayer de-
cision. Even Engel v. Vitale 370 US 421 (1962), the New York Regents 
prayer case, was unlikely to have been perceived as a threat to the Court's 
authority for there was no reason for the Court in Engel to antici pate 
that the Regents prayer would continue to be recited after it handed 
down its decision and indeed this practice ceased. 
Contrary to Rohde's designation, the protest area involving blacks 
hardly constituted a threat to the Court's authority. In these sit-in and 
other protest cases the Court failed to lay down explicit guidelines for 
the treatment of protestors ,and thus their arrest by the police cannot 
legitimately be characterized as a "serious resistance or disobedience to 
t!he Court's mandate." Rather , these cases were handled by the Court on 
a case-by-case basis with the justices deciding whether particular protest 
tactics in particular settings were legal. 
A good argument can be made, however, that the two criminal cate-
gories of involuntary confessions and warrantless search and seizure were 
justifiably regarded as threats to the Court's authority, for in these two 
areas there was extensive disobedience by the police of the Court's man-
rn Ibid., pp. 695-7. 
17 Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions." 
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date. In these cases a maximum vote 'W!as unlikely, nevetheless, for there 
was considerable ideological disagreement on the Court concerning 
its role in supervising the behavior of state police officials. In addition, 
we have no evidence that any efforts were made to attempt to obtain 
the votes of the minority justices for the Court's opinion. 
From this impressionistic analysis of the Rohde threat areas we 
hypothesize that only in the racial discrimination area will the Court itend 
to be maximum winning, while in the other threat areas ( and in the non-
threat areas as well) it will tend toward a minimum winning result. 
In the analysis of the threat hypothesis we examined both the cases 
of our data set and, since Bernd 18 attempted to reproduce Rohde's work, 
the results reported in two of his tables as well. The Bernd data con-
sisted of one table (Table 7) of nonthreat issue areas and another (Table 
9) of threat issue areas, both pertaining to full opinion cases in which 
nine justices participated. 
Rohde considered opinion coalitions of five or six as minimum win-
ning and those of eight or nine as maximum winning . We will employ this 
same definition. As a first test of the Rohde hypotihesis we broke down 
the threat issue areas contained in Bemd's Table 9 into two categories: 
Fifty-seven threat cases that involve questions of racial discrimination 
( or, more precisely, the racial discrimination and association category 
containing forty-two cases and itbe voting rights and civil rights acts 
areas consisting of fifteen cases) and, secondly, the other seventy threat 
cases. We then compared these two categories with the 291 monthreat 
cases in Bemd's Table 7. It was found that sixty-one percent of the 
coalitions in the nonthreat cases were five or six in size, while only 
twenty-one percent were eight or nine. In the non-racial discrimination 
threat cases the results were comparable; i.e., sixty-four percent were five 
or six person coalitions and twenty-seven percent were eight or nine. 
But the racial discrimination cases were strikingly different. Only thirty-
seven percent were five or six and fifty-two percent were eight or nine. 
Indeed, thirty-nine percent of the racial discrimination coalitions were 
unanimous. It is clear from these statistics that the important distinction 
is not between threat and nonthreat, as defined by Rhode and Bernd, but 
rather between racial discrimination cases and all the others. 
We then sought to determine whether using the data from Rohde's 
479 cases would yield the same results. We first combined the nonthreat 
and the non-racial discrimination threat cases into a new category of 
non-discrimination cases. This new category included 400 cases. Our ra-
18 Bernd. 
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cial discrimination group of cases consists of the same issue areas we used 
in constrncting the Bernd racial discrimination category and included all 
the cases from Rohde's scales No. 16, and No. 17 (racial discrimination), 
No. 18 ( voting rights), No. 19 ( civil rights acts) and the freedom of 
association cases involving blacks in scale No. 1. This category contains 
sixty-two cases. Seventeen cases which were decided by seven-man courts 
were excluded. We found that sixty-seven percent of the non-discrimin a-
tion cases were five- or six-man coalitions but only twenty percent were 
.eight or nine in size. In regard to the racial discrimination oases, however, 
the results were markedly different-twenty-four percent were five or six 
and sixty-one percent eight or nine, with forty percent of the coalitions 
unanimous. The differences are clear and unambiguous and support our 
hypothesis. 
Rohde's finding that in threat cases the winning coalition tended to 
be maximum and minimum in rabout equal proportions was the result of 
his merging together of two dissimilar categories of cases. The Court does 
not respond to Rohde's broad classification of threat situations by maxi-
mum winning voting. Rather it behaves in this way only in those threat 
situations in which the justices involved decide it is to their advantage to 
do so. We have suggested questions that the justices are likely to confront 
in making such an evaluation. Based upon probable responses to these 
questions, we hypothesized that only in racial discrimination oases were 
the conditions favorable for a maximum winning vote as the predomina nt 
pattern. Our typothesis was supported. Our conclusion not only refines 
the work of Rohde but that of Murphy 19 and Howard 20 as well, for all 
three scholars appear to contend that the mere existence of a threat and 
nothing more is sufficient to produce a maximum winning vote. 
19 Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1964) . 
20 J. Woodford Howard, "On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice," American Political 
Science Review 62 ( March 1968), 43-56. 
